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Abstract
Widely used payment splitting apps allow members
of a group to keep track of debts between members
by sending charges for expenses paid by one member
on behalf of others. While offering a great deal of
convenience, these apps gain access to sensitive data
on users’ financial transactions. In this paper, we
present a payment splitting app that hides all trans-
action data within a group from the service provider,
provides privacy protections between users in a group,
and provides integrity against malicious users or even
a malicious server.
The core protocol proceeds in a series of rounds
in which users either submit real data or cover traf-
fic, and the server blindly updates balances, informs
users of charges, and computes integrity checks on
user-submitted data. Our protocol requires no crypto-
graphic operations on the server, and after a group’s
initial setup, the only cryptographic tool users need
is AES.
We implement the payment splitting protocol as
an Android app and the accompanying server. We
find that, for realistic group sizes, it requires fewer
than 50 milliseconds per round of computation on
a user’s phone and the server requires fewer than
300 microseconds per round for each group, meaning
that our protocol enjoys excellent performance and
scalability properties.
1 Introduction
Payment-splitting apps solve the problem of keeping
track of debts between members of a group. They pro-
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vide a convenient interface and bookkeeping system for
groups to keep track of individual or communal costs
among their members. Common use cases involve
splitting bills for meals among friends or colleagues,
roommates keeping track of grocery, utility, or rent
charges, and groups of travelers monitoring expenses
during a trip. Groups can exist for a short term, e.g.
a vacation group, or indefinitely. There exist a great
number and variety of free payment splitting apps1,
with multiple having over 1 million downloads and
tens of thousands of positive reviews on the Google
Play app store.
Unfortunately, these apps leak a great deal of pri-
vate user data to the service provider. The pri-
vacy policy for Splitwise [38], perhaps the most well-
known payment splitting app, permits collection of,
“for example, group names, expense descriptions and
amounts, payments and their confirmation numbers,
comments and reminders, receipt images, notes, and
memos, in addition to any other information that you
attach or share” as well as “the types of expenses you
add, the features you use, the actions you take, and
the time, frequency and duration of your activities.”
A recent survey covering person-to-person payment
preferences in the US [13] discovered that three times
as many people prefer cash compared to mobile apps
for person-to-person payments. Among the perceived
benefits of cash, privacy leads in importance by the
largest margin, even when considering the convenience
of mobile payments. This suggests a need for a sys-
tem that combines the convenience of mobile pay-
ment splitting apps with cash-like privacy. Although
generic techniques from fully homomorphic encryp-
tion [20, 8, 21] and server-aided multiparty computa-
tion [19, 28, 29, 25] or even a system built on top of
1Some popular payment splitting apps: Splitwise, Receipt
Ninja, BillPin, SpotMe, Conmigo, and Settle Up.
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privacy-preserving cryptocurrencies [26, 30, 6] could
theoretically solve this problem, these solutions fall
short of the need for an efficient, highly scalable, and
secure solution.
In this work, we present a payment splitting app
that hides all transaction data within a group from the
service provider while also providing privacy against
non-involved group members and integrity against ma-
licious users or even a malicious server. Our payment
splitting protocol hides which group member pays in
a transaction, which member is paid, how much is
spent, when the transaction occurs, and even whether
a transaction has happened at all from the server
and entities external to the group. The server learns
only the membership of each group and nothing more.
Within a group, users not involved in a given real-
world transaction will not learn which group members
are indebted by that transaction. Moreover, our proto-
col is designed to ensure that neither a malicious user
nor the server itself can alter balances, frame other
users for charges, or otherwise tamper with the sys-
tem’s operation. Its server-side computation requires
no cryptographic operations, only arithmetic on 128-
bit integers, and, after an initial setup phase, the only
cryptographic operations on user devices are evalu-
ations of AES. A small-scale user survey motivates
design decisions regarding our security requirements
and the construction of the final system.
Our protocol operates in a setting where users can
connect to a central server but cannot communicate
directly with each other, a common design among
existing (non-private) payment splitting apps. The
server facilitates group setup, and clients then commu-
nicate through a server-assisted protocol in a series
of rounds. Members of each group share a secret
key. In each round, users send either a transaction
or cover traffic to the server. At a high level, each
user’s message is a vector containing masked transac-
tion information. We carefully design the structure
and content of messages to allow the server to blindly
update balances, to allow users to reject incorrect
charges, to check that no user has attempted to tam-
per unfairly with its own or others’ balances, and to
minimize information learned by users not involved
in a transaction. Moreover, our protocol takes advan-
tage of the structure of the payment splitting problem
to provide integrity protections without relying on
zero-knowledge proof techniques.
We implement an Android app and an accompany-
ing server that run our protocol and evaluate them
on commodity hardware. We find that, for groups
of up to 25 members (a realistic size, as determined
by our survey), our implementation requires fewer
than 50 milliseconds per round of computation on a
user’s phone and the server requires fewer than 300
microseconds per round for each group, with most
transactions requiring only a few rounds to complete
at most. Bandwidth requirements are also light, at
under 500 bytes of communication between a client
and the server in each round.
Our work is, to our knowledge, the first to con-
sider the problem of privacy-preserving payment split-
ting apps. We demonstrate that other, general-
purpose solutions cannot be easily adapted to ef-
ficiently solve this problem by comparing our sys-
tem to ZKLedger [34], a system designed for privacy-
preserving audits of distributed ledgers which can be
adapted to serve as a payment splitting system. Our
protocol’s computation time and bandwidth usage
outperform ZKLedger by 7.3× and 6.8× respectively
if it were used for a 10 member payment splitting
group, the largest size for which ZKLedger reports
end to end transaction times.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We introduce the notion of a privacy-preserving
payment splitting scheme and provide formal
definitions that model security for such a system.
• We construct and prove the security of a practical
and scalable privacy-preserving payment splitting
scheme.
• We implement and evaluate our system as an
Android app and an accompanying server, finding
that it requires fewer than 300µs of computation
per group on the server and 50ms on the client for
each round of the protocol in realistically sized
groups.
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2 System Goals
In this section, we present the goals for our system as
well as the notation and security definitions required
of a privacy-preserving payment splitting scheme.
User Survey. Before building our system, we con-
ducted a short survey in order to understand how
payment splitting apps are used and to guide our sys-
tem design and evaluation. The survey was sent via
email to approximately 250 individuals (employees in
an office building belonging to a large company) of
which 51 responded. All institutional requirements
to administer this survey were satisfied before it was
distributed. The full text of the survey appears in
Appendix A.
In terms of privacy preferences, we found that only
4% of respondents prefer to have their transactions
be public, which we take as confirmation of our belief
in the importance of investigating privacy-preserving
payment splitting. 70% of respondents preferred for
transactions to be visible only to their participants,
motivating the inclusion of debtor privacy in our se-
curity definitions. The data considered most sensitive
about transactions was the identity of the parties in-
volved. We will discuss other aspects of the survey
responses as they become relevant to the design of
our solution.
2.1 Functionality Goals
A payment splitting scheme, as we define it, allows
users to establish a group, add/remove members, send
each other charges, reject unwanted charges, and set-
tle the group balance. These operations can be cate-
gorized into group management operations, such as
setting up a group and adding/removing users, and
payment splitting operations that deal with the real
functionality offered by the scheme. Our definitions
and security arguments primarily focus on modeling
payment splitting operations, as the group manage-
ment operations are fairly straightforward and do not
impact security. We support the following payment
splitting operations.
Request. Any user in a group may send a request
for any amount of money to any other user.
Reject. Since a payment splitting app cannot know
what real-world payments actually occured, users can
reject charges which they dispute or were sent in error.
Splitwise and some of its competitors immediately
subtract money from a user’s balance when the user
is sent a request and then restore the money if the
request happens to be rejected. As such, we observe
that any system which offers the ability to trace who
has made a given payment request automatically also
implicitly allows rejections because an identical pay-
ment request can be sent in the opposite direction to
cancel the first. For this reason, we focus on includ-
ing a trace functionality that reveals who initiated
a request instead of implementing rejection directly.
With the proper application logic running on top of
the core protocol (as in our system), this approach
provides the same interface to the user of a private
payment splitting app as one that has a built-in re-
jection operation.
Settle. Payment splitting apps simplify paying
friends back by treating users’ debts as being owed
to the group instead of to various individuals. While
users can pay each other back directly for each charge,
the service can also simplify payments by telling each
user who to pay and how much to pay in order to
most efficiently settle all the group’s balances at once.
One way to implement a settle operation would
be for users to get a matrix indicating who should
pay whom. We opt to describe this in terms of users
getting a vector of balances because such a matrix
can easily be derived from the vector.
Having described the payment splitting functional-
ity we plan to achieve, we end this section with a cor-
rectness property that our payment splitting scheme
must satisfy. The definition states the intuitive notion
that, as long as all parties follow the protocol, the
scheme should maintain an accurate running balance
of debts between group members after each operation
in a way that the originator of each transaction can
be traced.
Definition 1 (Correctness). A payment splitting
scheme is correct if, when all users and the server
act honestly,
i) the balances revealed by a settle operation cor-
respond to the sum of all requests made since
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the formation of the group when the vector of
balances was filled with zeros, and
ii) after each transaction, each user’s own recorded
balance always matches the corresponding value
in the vector that would be returned by a settle
operation.
2.2 Security Goals
Our system achieves the following security properties,
summarized below and described in greater depth
later in this section.
Server Privacy. For any transaction, the server
should not know which group members are involved
in the transaction or how much is spent in the transac-
tion. Details of who makes transactions when, rejected
charges, etc should also be hidden.
Debtor Privacy. Up until the group settles (when
it becomes clear who is indebted because they need
to pay), no transaction will reveal which users it puts
into debt.
User Integrity. No user should be able to take
advantage of privacy to create money for him/herself
or otherwise maliciously tamper with balances.
Server Integrity. A malicious server cannot cause
the protocol to deviate from correct functionality ex-
cept by denial of service. This requirement only ap-
plies in the malicious security setting and is not in-
cluded when we consider a semihonest server that
follows the rules of the protocol while trying to learn
user secrets.
Note that although our system will provide privacy
and integrity guarantess against both malicious users
and servers, it will not protect against collusion be-
tween a malicious user and the server. Fortunately
this combination of malicious actors is not a major con-
cern in practice since the threats posed by a malicious
server and a malicious user are usually orthogonal.
For example, payment splitting groups typically con-
sist of people who know each other in real life, making
it infeasible for a malicious server to insert a fake user
into a group so long as the group setup procedure is
secure (we discuss options for setting up groups in
our scheme in Section 4.1). On the other hand, the
owner of a payment splitting server is not typically
invited into a group by the users of the service, so
a malicious server operator would need to find an-
other way to compromise integrity. One shortcoming
of this approach is that it prevents a member of a
group from self-hosting a payment splitting server, but
self-hosting is not supported by most (non-private)
payment splitting apps in use today either. Support-
ing security against malicious clients and servers that
collude is a compelling problem for future work.
2.3 Security Definitions
We now define the security requirements our system
must meet. In terms of server privacy, we want our
scheme to reveal to the server only group membership
and hide any details of transaction parties, quantities,
frequencies, etc. We formalize this with a security
game where no server can distinguish between two
potential transcripts of requests for a given group.
Our server privacy definition also implies protection
against an adversary who eavesdrops on the network
or controls users in other groups in addition to the
server itself.
Definition 2 (Server Privacy Experiment). The
server privacy experiment PRIV[A, λ, b] with security
parameter λ is played between an adversary A who
plays the role of the server and a challenger C who is
given input b and plays the honest users U1...UN .
1. Setup. Adversary A picks a group size N and
sets up a group with C playing the role of the
users.
2. Transactions. A sends C two transactions t0 and
t1, both of which are either a request between
group members or a settle operation. If exactly
one of t0 and t1 is a settle operation, C aborts
the experiment and outputs 0. Next, C interacts
with A to carry out operation tb. A can repeat
this step as many times as it wishes.
3. Output. A outputs a bit b′.
PRIV[A, λ, b] outputs the value b′ returned by A
at the end of the game.
Definition 3 (Server Private). A payment splitting
scheme is server private if no PPT adversary can win
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the server privacy game with greater than negligible
advantage. That is, if the quantity |Pr[PRIV[A, λ, 0] =
1]− Pr[PRIV[A, λ, 1] = 1] ≤ negl(λ)| for any PPT A.
In addition to complete privacy against the server,
we require a notion of privacy against other users in
a group as well, which we call debtor privacy. Debtor
privacy protects the privacy of users who become
indebted to other group members by hiding the target
of any request. Informally, we say that a payment
splitting scheme is debtor private if any coalition of
compromised users cannot determine the identity of
the requestee in a given transaction before the group
settles. Note that since the adversary in this game
corrupts members of the group, it has access to any
group-wide secrets used to hide information from the
server.
Definition 4 (Debtor Privacy Experiment). The
debtor privacy experiment DEBTPRIV[A, λ, b] with
security parameter λ is played between an adversary
A who plays the role of compromised users, and a
challenger C who plays the server and uncompromised
users and is given input b.
1. Setup. Adversary A picks a group size N and
a set of indexes M ⊂ [N ] of users to corrupt,
|M | = n, n < N . Adversary A and challenger C
set up a group with A playing the role of users
Ui for i ∈ M ′ where M ′ ⊆ M is a subset of the
adversary’s choosing. Challenger C plays the role
of the server and all users Ui, i /∈M ′. After the
group is set up, C sends A all secrets and any
other state it holds for users Ui, i ∈M .
2. Transactions. A sends C two transactions t0 and
t1, both of which are either a request between
group members or a settle operation. If any of
the following conditions are met, C aborts the
experiment and outputs 0.
(a) Exactly one of t0 and t1 is a settle operation.
(b) A user Ui, i ∈M is either making a charge
or being charged and t0 6= t1.
(c) A user Ui making a request differs between
t0 and t1.
(d) t0 and t1 are settle operations, but the bal-
ances returned differ for any user.
Next, C interacts with A to carry out operation
tb. A can repeat this step as many times as it
wishes.
3. Output. A outputs a bit b′.
DEBTPRIV[A, λ, b] outputs the value b′ returned
by A at the end of the game.
Definition 5 (Debtor Private). A payment split-
ting scheme is debtor private if no PPT ad-
versary can win the debtor privacy game with
greater than negligible advantage. That is,
if the quantity |Pr[DEBTPRIV[A, λ, 0] = 1] −
Pr[DEBTPRIV[A, λ, 1] = 1] ≤ negl(λ)| for any PPT
A.
Our definition of debtor privacy only applies in
the context of requests and not settlements. Since
money must change hands outside of the system when
a group settles, it is necessary that some information
about who is in debt be revealed at that point.
One could imagine even stronger notions of privacy
against other users, but we leave the task of build-
ing stronger security notions that precisely quantify
leakage in settlement and also provide privacy for
the requester to future work. We feel that protect-
ing debtors provides a good balance between security
and functionality where critical privacy needs are ad-
dressed while the resulting system can still be built
from the most lightweight cryptographic tools.
We also require groups to have integrity, which we
separate into user integrity and server integrity. User
integrity requires three properties. First, we want
to ensure that users cannot silently corrupt the bal-
ances kept by the server. We capture this property
by observing that the balances kept by the server are
valid so long as they all sum to zero, meaning that if
everyone who is in debt pays, then everyone who is
owed money gets all their money back. Second, we
need to ensure that even if some users are malicious,
they cannot “confuse” other users by causing them to
have a locally stored balance that differs from their
reported balance if the group were to settle. Third,
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we want to prevent malicious charges between users,
but a malicious charge (i.e., a charge disputed by a
user, though processed correctly by the system) can
simply be rejected or charged back by the user who
does not want to pay (just like in payment apps widely
in use today). We must ensure, however, that an at-
tacker cannot get away with framing a different group
member as the originator of an unwanted charge to
avoid being charged back. We include both properties
in the definition of user integrity below. Section 6
describes how we can achieve stronger notions of user
integrity, e.g., where we identify which user attempted
to corrupt the sum of user balances or allow a framed
user to not only detect but also prove that she has
been framed.
Definition 6 (User Integrity). Consider a PPT ad-
versary A who corrupts up to N − 1 users Ui in a
group of size N . We say that a payment splitting
scheme has user integrity if the following properties
are satisfied except with negligible probability in the
security parameter λ:
– After each request, either the server detects it as
an invalid transaction (and can roll it back) or, if
the members of the group were to settle at that
time, the resulting vector of user balances would
sum to zero.
– After each request, either the server detects it
as an invalid transaction (and can roll it back)
or, if the members of the group were to settle
at that time, each honest user’s entry in the
vector returned by settling would match its locally
stored balance.
– Any attempt to tamper with the output of the
trace functionality such that it falsely points to an
honest user who was not involved in a transaction
can be detected by the framed honest user.
Finally, server integrity requires that a malicious
server cannot tamper with user balances without being
detected by the users.
Definition 7 (Server Integrity). Consider a (poten-
tially malicious) PPT server S∗ operating a group of
size N . We say that a payment splitting scheme has
server integrity if, after each transaction, if members
of the group were to settle at that point, they would
either detect that S∗ has acted maliciously or output
the same vector of balances as they would when inter-
acting with an honest server S, except with negligible
probability in the security parameter λ.
3 Architecture Overview
Our architecture consists of a mobile app and a server
operating in the setting where devices running the
mobile app have a secure network connection with
the server but no connection with each other, as is
commonly the case in payment apps used today. In
addition to being widely used in practice, this architec-
ture enables convenient group management and enjoys
faster latency than decentralized systems. We leave
the investigation of alternative settings, e.g. peer-
to-peer distributed networks between phones, as an
interesting problem for future work and briefly discuss
some possibilities in Section 8.
Users of our app organize themselves into groups,
and users within a group can send charges to each
other to request money. Different groups operate in-
dependently of each other, and one server can support
many groups at once. We describe our solution in
the context of a single group, but the protocol can be
repeated separately in parallel for as many groups as
a server can support.
Similar to many other privacy-preserving protocols
(for example, [43, 37, 18, 39, 4]), our core protocol
proceeds in a series of rounds. To hide which users
are and are not participating in transactions, users
in each round send the server either a message rep-
resenting a transaction or cover traffic to hide real
transactions. With all users online, this provides
complete anonymity within the group for the user
sending a real transaction (provided the protocol used
provides server privacy). We discuss the resilience
of our solution’s anonymity to users going offline in
Section 6.
Inadequacy of Trivial Solutions. The rest of this
section discusses a number of solutions to the prob-
lem of privacy-preserving payment splitting that use
powerful generic ideas from cryptography or attempt
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to use simple tools na¨ıvely. We sketch each approach
and then explain why it is inadequate either in terms
of performance or security.
The most generic cryptographic tools available for
this problem come from fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) [20, 8, 21] or server-aided multiparty computa-
tion [19, 28, 29, 25]. These techniques allow users to
upload ciphertexts to a server who can then compute
arbitrary functions on the encrypted data and send
users back the result. Unfortunately, techniques from
fully homomorphic encryption remain too slow for
use in all but the most limited settings. Although
adding subtracting from a user’s balance only requires
support for addition and subtraction, which can be
achieved with significantly more lightweight crypto-
graphic tools, one of the core technical challenges of
our work lies in finding ways to allow a server to
blindly route payments between users without the full
power of general FHE. Another possibility is to use
multiparty computation, but multiparty computation
techniques in the server-aided setting rely on garbled
circuits [41, 42], which operate on boolean circuits and
therefore incur an additional evaluation of AES for
each gate in the boolean circuit representing the func-
tion to be calculated. We further discuss related work
in generic techniques applicable to payment splitting
in Section 9.
Instead of using powerful cryptographic tools, one
may also try to achieve our security goals through
na¨ıve use of basic cryptographic tools such as encryp-
tion or signatures. Consider the trivial scheme where
users simply broadcast their encrypted transactions
to all other users in a group, using the server to route
each message to all other group members. In order
to ensure user integrity, users could then gossip the
messages they receive by re-sending them to all other
group members. This results in a scheme with O(λN2)
communication between the client and servers and
can be further reduced to O(λN) communication by
having users only gossip signatures over the messages
they receive instead of the messages themselves.
The scheme above can provide some of the prop-
erties we want from a privacy-preserving payment
splitting scheme, but not all of them. In particular,
all transactions in that approach are visible to every
member of the group, so it does not achieve debtor
privacy. In general, it is easy to provide one or the
other of our privacy requirements – debtor privacy
without server privacy could easily be achieved in an
existing payment splitting app modified to hide some
transaction information from users – but combining
them in the same scheme requires more work.
4 Core Functionality
This section presents the core functionality for privacy-
preserving payment splitting. We begin with a sim-
plified version of our protocol that provides neither
efficiency nor security and add in features to improve
security and performance one at a time. We will
present two variants of our system: one that is only
secure against a semihonest server who adheres to the
rules of the protocol while trying to learn user secrets
and another that is secure against a fully malicious
server who can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol.
Proofs of security appear in Section 5, and we discuss
a number of extensions to the core functionality in
Section 6.
Our constructions derive their security from the
assumption that there exists a pseudorandom function
(PRF), e.g. that AES is a secure PRF. Informally,
a PRF has the property that an adversary cannot
distinguish between a random string and the output
of a PRF on a given input. The formal definition of
a PRF follows.
Definition 8 (Pseudorandom Functions [23]). Let
F : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be an efficiently com-
putable, length-preserving keyed function. We say
that F is a pseudorandom function (PRF) if for all
probabilistic polynomial time distinguishers D,
|Pr[DFk(1n) = 1]− Pr[Dfn(1n) = 1]|
is negligible where k ← {0, 1}n is chosen uniformly at
random and fn is chosen uniformly at random from
the set of functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit
strings.
Setup and sharing keys. A group begins when its
N members agree on a shared key. The details of how
group members share a key are covered by prior work
7
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Figure 1: Our basic payment splitting protocol. The
full protocol uses the output of a PRF whose key is
known to all group members to mask and authenti-
cate each user-submitted value. The server also sums
all user-submitted values and polls users to ensure
the sum matches the group size. Left: an example
transaction where user A charges user B one unit of
currency. Each user submits a vector with a single
nonzero entry, and the server subtracts one from each
user’s balance, leaving “-1” in user A’s entry and “+1”
in user B’s entry. Right: the tracing procedure for
the same transaction. The server subtracts 1 from
what users put in their own entries in the vectors they
submit. This results in zero everywhere except for
user A, who made a request. The resulting differences
are multiplied by increasing powers of 2 and summed
to uniquely identify which user(s) made a request in
that round. In case of collisions, all users making
requests are identified by the sum – they roll back
and resend their requests one by one.
and constitute an orthogonal problem. One possibility
is for one group member to pick the key and send it
to the others, encrypting it with a public key for each
other member. The server can keep a bank of users’
public keys, as is common in encrypted messaging
apps, or use a system such as CONIKS[32] in the
malicious server setting.
4.1 The Basic Protocol
Over 90% of our survey respondents reported that
transactions in their payment splitting groups are for
values under $100, meaning that large transactions
rarely occur. We take advantage of this by designing
our protocol to restrict the amount of money that
can be transferred in a single transaction and then
using the structure resulting from this restriction to
enforce integrity requirements without relying on zero
knowledge. In the simplified protocol presented here,
only one unit of currency changes hands in each round,
thus exchanging $X requires X rounds. Later, we
will show how to allow users to exchange $X using
only logX rounds and how to run several rounds in
parallel without increasing bandwidth costs. Since
payment splitting apps are most frequently used for
small quantities of money, these restrictions do not
pose a significant performance obstacle for day to day
transactions, and an occasional larger transaction can
simply be split across multiple rounds. In our final de-
sign, a transaction of $1, 000.00 requires only 3 rounds
to complete. Although we describe our protocol in
terms of dollars, we do not require users to round
transactions to the nearest dollar, and, in particular,
we allow transactions at the 1 cent granularity.
To introduce the structure of our approach, we will
begin by describing our system such that it is missing
most privacy and integrity properties. We will then
add privacy and integrity one at a time. This basic
version of our protocol is demonstrated in Figure 1.
Setup. The group begins when its N members agree
on a secret key. The server creates a vector of N zeros
to represent user balances, with users being assigned
numbered 1 through N .
Group membership operations. An existing
member adds a new member to the group and sends
it the key. The server adds another 0 to the vector of
balances and informs the other group members. To
leave a group, a user who has paid all his debts and
has a balance of 0 notifies the server (who informs
other users), and has his entry removed from the vec-
tor of balances. A former member who has left a
group still holds the group key, so if remaining group
members do not trust former members with the key,
they must form a new group using a different key.
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Requests. Payment proceeds in a series of rounds.
In each round, a user can request one unit of currency
from another. Each user sends the server a vector of
size N where all entries are zeros except for a single
1 in the cell corresponding to the user who will be
charged. Users wishing not to make a transaction in
a given round put their 1 in the cell for their own
account.
The server sums the vectors it receives from each
user and adds that to the balance vector. Then it
subtracts 1 from the balance of each user. This results
in each user either breaking even or transferring one
unit to another user. The values in users’ balances in
this scheme represent the amount of debt they owe
to the group, so putting a 1 in the balance of another
user means “giving” them one unit of debt. Note that
since users only receive updates to their own balance
in a given round, the scheme naturally satisfies the
notion of debtor privacy.
Tracing. In order to support tracing, we first assign
each member of the group a power of 2, so group
member i is assigned the value 2i. Each user then
has an additional value associated with them by the
server, formed by subtracting 1 from the ith element
of their request vector. Thus a user who is not making
any charges has a 0 and a user who is requesting a
payment has a -1. Deriving users’ values from the
vectors they already sent instead of sending them
separately saves one message of bandwidth from each
group member to the server. The server multiplies
each value with the power of 2 assigned to that group
member and sends the sum of the resulting values to
each user.
The users learn from this sum exactly which parties
are charging in this round since the resulting value
will be unique for each subset of powers of 2. When
only one party is charging, a user who disagrees with
a charge can reject the charge by initiating a charge
of the same value in the opposite direction. Integrity
against framing can easily be built on this mechanism
by having a user who has been framed report that she
has been framed.
In the event that multiple users are charging in
the same round, a chargee cannot know which of the
chargers originated a particular transaction, so the
next few rounds are used to resolve the collision. In
the first round, all the transactions of the previous
round are “rolled back” by having the chargers submit
a +2 in their own indexes and the chargees a −1. In
subsequent rounds, each of the charges are made again
with the lowest numbered charger making its request
in the first round, the second lowest numbered charger
making its request in the second round, and so on.
Other users wanting to make a charge wait until the
resolution process completes to make their charges.
This technique can be used to resolve nested collisions
too. Since by the time a request completes, the value
sent to identify the charger will definitely be a power
of 2, there can only be one user who has been charged
and the log of that power of 2 will be the identity of
the charger.
At first glance, it may appear inconvenient that
our system processes transactions within a group one
at a time and requires rollbacks and serialization for
colliding transactions. However, we found that over
90% of our survey respondents’ groups had no more
than 3 transactions in a typical day, meaning that a
rollback like the one described here will not need to
be used frequently. Given that our protocol supports
nested collisions and can operate transparently to
the end-user, we see this mechanism as a favorable
bandwidth-saving mechanism over a scheme where
the server sends much more information to users in
each round to avoid rollbacks.
Note that our user tracing functionality (and user
integrity definition) only ensures that the requestor
in a transaction has not been modified to frame an
uninvolved party. This is critical in order for users
being charged to reject false charges. It is, however,
possible for a malicious user to change who is being
charged. For example, a malicious user who knows
that a particular user is going to be charged in a
given round can put a 1 in his own index, a -1 in
the index of the user who is supposed to be charged,
and a 1 in the index of the user to which he wants
to attempt to redirect the charge. Fortunately, as
long as users do not accept charges when they do not
owe debts in real life, the fact that the requestor of a
charge cannot be tampered with ensures that this kind
of framing has limited impact. If the user interface
appropriately notifies users about who is charging
them (as is common in payment splitting apps used
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today), they can reject unexpected charges due to
this kind of attack just as they would an accidental
charge.
Settling. Users settle by downloading the balance
vector from the server and handling payments via
another channel.
4.2 Adding Privacy and Integrity
We now show how to modify the scheme described
above to achieve privacy and integrity.
Privacy. We provide privacy by masking all the
values sent by clients with the outputs of a PRF f
evaluated with a key sk chosen during group setup.
Let vi,j represent the value in the j
th position of a
vector sent by user i. For every value vi,j in round
m, there will be a PRF output ri,j = f(sk,m||i||j)
and the value sent to the server instead of vi,j will be
vi,j + ri,j .
In order to maintain correctness, each user will
compute all values of ri,j in each round and keep
a running sum of all the rs that have been added
into their own balances. They can do this because
the PRF key is shared by all members of the group.
When receiving balances from the server, users will
subtract off the sum of all the r values that have been
added to the balance to retrieve their actual balance.
When receiving the sum used for tracing, users must
subtract off the relevant r values multiplied by the
corresponding powers of 2 with which they will have
been multiplied by the server.
Integrity. After receiving inputs from the clients,
the server takes the sum of the values it wishes to add
to the balance vector and polls each user to make sure
the value is equal to the number of members in the
group plus the sum of all r values used as masks in
that round. This check protects against silent growth
in the total balance of the group. The checks can be
done asynchronously with other operations and rounds
can be rolled back after-the-fact if an issue is found.
Note that this integrity mechanism will work even if
the group members are in the middle of rolling back a
transaction (as described in the previous subsection)
because even though individual users will not send
vectors that contain exactly one non-zero entry, the
sum of all users’ vectors will be the same as in any
other round. This mechanism provides the first of our
two requirements for integrity, and protection against
framing is provided implicitly by our technique for
tracing because a user’s app can automatically detect
if it is traced as the originator of a charge in a round
where it did not actually make a request.
4.3 Malicious Security
We can make our construction secure against malicious
servers with no changes to the server, no increase in
per-round bandwidth, minimal changes on the client,
and a one-round increase in the case of colliding trans-
actions. In place of masking each value sent to the
server with a pseudorandom ri,j , we send the value
svi,j + ri,j for a fixed s also generated at group cre-
ation time from the PRF. This value is very similar to
the homomorphic MAC tag of Agrawal and Boneh [2]
but we use it to achieve different security properties.
We must verify that our scheme still works under
this change. The integrity check needs to check that
the sum sent from the server equals s ·N plus the sum
of rs instead of just N but otherwise works unmodified.
We must also add an integrity check to the setup
process because the server cannot generate a vector
of 1s on its own and needs to be sent such a vector
from one of the users. Other users must check that
the vector sent to the server actually consists of all
1s.
Next, users, upon receiving their new balance from
the server, know that the new value will be at most
one away from the old value. As such, they can check
each of the three possible values by multiplying the
possible balances by s and seeing which matches the
sent value after removing the r values. If the new
value does not match one of the three possibilities,
there has either been a collision in payment requests
or the server has been caught behaving maliciously.
The tracing mechanism will require a slightly larger
change. First, users do a linear scan of the N possible
cases where only one member of the group is making
a request by checking if the value received from the
server is equal to −s ·2i for i ∈ [N ] after removing the
r values. If none of these match, then there has been a
collision, but we are no longer able to determine which
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users collided. We solve this by using the next round
of the protocol to re-send values from this round but
without the s multiplied in – just as we would have in
the plain PRF-based construction. After the server
sends its responses, the tags from the previous round
are used to verify that it did not modify the values
and then the identities of the chargers can be checked
just as before. The roll-back round must increase the
amount by which balances are rolled back to account
for the repeat of the colliding transactions being added
by the server into balances.
Finally, this construction requires some extra work
to settle the group because users will not know what
value to expect for each other user’s balance. This
can be solved by having each user upload a masked
value representing their balance and then other users
can check to make sure that the value matches the
one sent by the server. Since the values sent by a
user and the server must match, allowing the users to
upload their masked values does not allow users to lie
about their balances.
4.4 Larger Transactions
Sending one unit of currency at a time leads to too
many rounds to transact larger amounts. We can
modify the round structure so each round is accom-
panied by a value multiplier. In this version of our
scheme, each round has a predetermined value, and
all transactions in that round are of that value instead
of just 1. The schedule of round values can be fixed
at some reasonable configuration (e.g. the first sev-
eral powers of 2). It is important that the multiplier
be applied on the server side (by multiplying each
received vector) or else this would open the scheme
to attacks on user integrity and break the correctness
of our approach for rejecting charges.
In order to further speed up transactions, several
rounds corresponding to different values can take place
in parallel. This can be done with little to no increase
in bandwidth by using transaction packing, where we
take advantage of the fact that we instantiate our PRF
with AES, which has a 128-bit output. If user balances
are unlikely to exceed some large value, say 221, we
can split each masked value sent to the server into
6 separate “slots” where users can put transactions,
treating each message as 6 separate transactions, each
using 21-bit messages. This will result in the server
keeping 6 separate 21-bit “sub-balances” for each user.
The user’s total balance is their sum. Summing the
sub-balances occurs transparently to the human user
whose interaction with the app is unaffected by the
optimization.
4.5 Full Protocol
Here we formalize the malicious-secure PRF-based
construction described above. The semihonest con-
struction is a similar but simpler version of the same
protocol and appears in Appendix B. The construc-
tion assumes that users share a key sk as described
above and omits details of the key-sharing mechanism.
To focus on the core protocol, the construction is
written such that each round has value 1 and does not
use the transaction-packing optimization described
above, but these can easily be added. We say that a
party outputs ⊥ to indicate that an integrity violation
has been detected that must be handled out of band,
e.g. by users moving to a more trustworthy server or
kicking someone out of the group.
Our fully malicious secure payment splitting scheme
Pm with security parameter λ and group size N uses
a PRF f with range {0, 1}λ. After setup, the scheme
proceeds in rounds, and messages are sent from each
client at a rate of one per round. Let m at any
time denote the round number at which the current
operation began, let s = f(sk, 0), and let rm,i,j denote
f(sk,m——i——j) except rm,i,j = 0 for values of m
smaller than the round in which user Ui joined the
group or after it left.
Setup. The server stores a vector b of length N
constructed from copies of 0. User U1 sends the server
a value a, which represents a masked version of 1. Let
a represent a vector of length N constructed from N
copies of a. The server sends a to each user, and the
users reject if a 6= s+ f(sk, 1). The users then store
values bi = 0, b
′
i = 0, and the key sk.
Request. User i requests a unit of currency from
user j according to the following steps.
1. Clients prepare vectors. In the next round m,
user Ui creates a vector vi where vi,j = s+ rm,i,j
11
and vi,k = 0 + rm,i,k∀k 6= j. All other users Uk
create vectors vk where vk,k = s + rm,k,k and
vk,k′ = 0 + rm,k,k′∀k′ 6= k. Each user sends its
vector vi or vk to the server.
2. Server processes vectors. Upon receiving the mes-
sages from clients for the round, the server takes
the sum v = ΣNi=1vi and also sums the values in
v to get v′. The server then sets b = b + v− a
and computes the value c = ΣNi=1(vi,i − a) · 2i.
The server sends the tuple (v′, c, bl) to user Ul,
l ∈ [N ].
3. Clients check integrity, update balances. Each
user receives the values (v′∗, c∗, b∗l ) from the
server. Then there are a number of cases:
(a) Integrity failure. If v′∗ 6= sN +
ΣNi=0Σ
N
j=0rm,i,j , the user sends an error mes-
sage to the server who sets b = b − v + a
and outputs ⊥.
(b) Balance update or framing failure. Other-
wise, if c∗ = −2i ·s−ΣNj=1((rm,j,j+f(sk, 1))·
2j) for some i ∈ [N ], the user checks whether
b∗l = bl + xs + Σ
N
j=1rm,j,l − f(sk, 1) for
x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. If so, it sets bl = b∗l and
b′l = b
′
l + x for the appropriate x. If vi,i = 1
(if user i did not make a request), user i
sends an error message to the server who in
turn outputs ⊥.
(c) Request collision. If neither of the above
cases apply, then more than one request
collided in the same round m (or the server
misbehaved). The next two rounds are used
to resolve the potential collision.
Round m + 1. In the next round (m+1),
the users send the same vectors they sent
in round m but with updated values for r
and without multiplying anything by s. De-
note the values sent from the server (which
behaves the same as above) in round m+ 1
as (v′∗∗c∗∗, b∗∗l ). Upon receiving their re-
sponses from the server, users check that the
values received from the server in this round
correspond to the same values received in
the previous round (modulo differences due
to lack of s and the new values for r). If
any of these checks fail, users output ⊥.
Round m+2. In the next round (m+2), each
party Ui, i ∈ [N ] submits a vector vi such
that vi,i = b
∗∗
i −bi−rm,i,i−rm+1,i,i+rm+2,i,i
and vi,k = 0+rm+2,i,k∀k 6= i and the server
behaves as above. Then the various requests
that collided in this round are repeated, each
in a subsequent round, in order from small-
est to largest value of ij as the requester.
Trace. User j checks if anyone has charged her in
round m∗ as follows. The user checks whether b∗j =
bj + xs+ Σ
N
l=1rm∗,l,j − f(sk, 1) for x ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and,
if so, knows she has been charged x units of currency.
If no value of x matches, she outputs ⊥. If her balance
has shrunk as a result of the transaction, she looks
at the value of c∗ in that round and sets i∗ ∈ [N ] to
be the value for which c∗ = −2i∗ · s− ΣNl=1((rm∗,l,l +
f(sk, 1)) · 2l). User i∗ is the number of the user who
made the charge.
Settle. The server outputs the vector b to the users.
Users respond by sending a fresh masking of their
stored values b′i to the server, who forwards the value
to all other users, which in turn unmask and retrieve
the value. Users then check that for each i ∈ [N ],
b′i ·s = bi−m ·f(sk, 1)−Σmm′=1ΣNj=1rm′,i,j , and reject
if any check fails. The output vector b is formed by
concatenating the b′is.
5 Complexity & Security
We state the protocol’s complexity in terms of a single
round, but since our scheme limits the size of transac-
tions, O(logX) rounds may be needed to send $X in
the general case, resulting in a multiplicative O(logX)
overhead. However, our transaction packing technique
can run several rounds in parallel without increasing
bandwidth or requiring additional AES evaluations.
The bandwidth per round for our scheme is O(N)
ciphertexts from each user to the server and then 3
ciphertexts from the server back to each client, each of
size λ. In practice, the ciphertexts in the PRF-based
schemes can just be λ = 128 bits long.
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Our construction proceeds in rounds such that there
is one transaction per round as long as there is no
collision between users trying to make charges at the
same time. In the case of a collision, the semihonest
scheme loses 2 rounds (detect collision, roll back trans-
actions) whereas the malicious secure scheme loses
3 rounds (retrieve non-tag version of values, detect
collision, roll back transactions).
Settling requires one message of size O(λN) from
the server to each user in the semihonest case, and in
the malicious server case this is preceded by messages
of size O(λ) from each user to the server.
Server. The server does the same process in each
round in both the semihonest and malicious construc-
tions and runs in time O(λN2). The settle operation
requires O(λN) work on the server to send the stored
balances, and server storage is O(λN) to hold bal-
ances.
Client. Our solution requires O(λN2) time to gen-
erate the PRF outputs and take the necessary sums.
Achieving malicious security adds lower order terms
for various checks but still requires O(λN2) time in
a normal round, with the potential cost of an extra
round in case of a collision (see above). Settling can
be done in O(λN) time by the client if the large sum
that needs to be taken is built incrementally and saved
during each round. Although O(λN) computation for
each round would be more desirable, we find in our
evaluation that performance for realistic group sizes
remains quite fast.
Security. We now state our security theorems for
both the semihonest and fully malicious constructions.
We defer proofs to Appendix C, which proves that our
scheme satisfies the properties of a secure payment
splitting scheme as described in Section 2.
Theorem 9. Assuming f is a secure PRF, the semi-
honest secure payment splitting scheme Pp has cor-
rectness, server privacy, debtor privacy, and user in-
tegrity.
Theorem 10. Assuming f is a secure PRF, the fully
malicious secure payment splitting scheme Pm has cor-
rectness, server privacy, debtor privacy, user integrity,
and server integrity (against a malicious server).
6 Extensions
This section briefly describes a number of extensions
to the core protocol that may be useful in practice.
Identifying misbehaving users. Our user integrity
checks, as described thus far, allow users to detect
whether a user has misbehaved, but we would also
like to be able to determine which users have misbe-
haved in order to punish them or prevent membership
in future groups. We can easily accomplish this by
having the server send each user all the messages it
received in the previous round, so users can check to
see whose input was malformed. Unfortunately, this
approach requires the server to send each user N2 ci-
phertexts and, more importantly, compromises debtor
privacy by revealing who was charged in that round.
It is, however, possible to identify misbehaving users
without breaking privacy. User integrity requires that
the sum of all values in all users’ vectors is 1. Ob-
serve that in order to tell whether a user violated
integrity, other users only need to learn whether the
user submitted a vector whose entries do not sum to
1. As such, the server only needs to distribute the
sum of each user’s vector, and any user whose vector
does not sum to 1 must be misbehaving (except in
the case of a transaction that rolls back a collision,
but all users will be aware that this is happening).
This does not compromise debtor privacy because the
sum for an honest user will always be 1 regardless of
whether or not that user is involved in a transaction.
Moreover, the server now only needs to send each user
N ciphertexts instead of N2.
Handling framing. User integrity also requires that
a user who has not initiated a charge can detect that
she is being framed. An additional practical concern
is for the victim of framing to prove his or her inno-
cence to other users and to identify the misbehaving
user who did the framing. Our basic scheme does not
offer a mechanism for other users to verify a claim
that someone has been framed. We can, however, add
such a mechanism without much work. A user can
prove innocence when framed by asking the server to
send every user the single entry in her vector corre-
sponding to the index of the user she has purportedly
charged. If that entry is a zero (as it will always be
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if she did not really make a charge), then she has
clearly been framed. We stress that it is not the hu-
man user herself who detects and proves that she has
been framed, but the user’s app, which sees it has
been traced as the requester in a charge yet knows
that the human user has not charged anyone in that
round. The problem of detecting who has done the
framing without weakening debtor privacy appears
more difficult, and we leave this problem for future
work.
Handling users going offline. Our schemes can
be modified to handle users going offline. Intuitively,
the server supplies a vector that represents making
no charges on behalf of any user who does not send
anything in a round. The server adds in a plaintext
vector for any missing users and notifies others about
who did not send a message in a given round so that
they know whose r values to omit from the various
sums.
The same approach works in the malicious security
solution, but here we need to make a tradeoff. Allow-
ing the server to be resilient to offline users means
giving it the power to exclude any users’ transactions
by saying that they were not present for that round.
Of course, the server does not know what a user is do-
ing in any round, meaning this kind of attack amounts
to a denial of service possibility (and the server could
always deny service more directly), but our security
definition would need to be modified to explicitly al-
low this kind of omission on the part of the server.
We do note that this denial of service attack would
be undetectable by other users, a consideration which
should be taken into account before deciding whether
or not to enable this feature.
Our security guarantees degrade gracefully in the
absence of some users, with a transaction’s anonymity
set always being equal to the number of online users
and user integrity holding so long as one honest user
is online. The definitions in Section 2 all describe
a setting where users are always online, providing
an anonymity set of size N for each transaction and
enforcing user integrity against N − 1 malicious users.
When the number of online users is reduced to N ′ <
N , our scheme provides an anonymity set of size N ′
and user integrity against N ′ − 1 users. Even if no
honest users are online when a malicious transaction
is made, they can still detect a malicious transaction
when they come back online later and the server sends
them messages they missed.
Improving usability for tracing and charge re-
quests. A user making a charge can indicate the
total amount they wish to charge (split across several
rounds) by sending a second encrypted value con-
taining the amount whereas other users upload an
encryption of zero. The server sums the encrypted
values and sends the result to each client. This way
clients know how much they will be charged at once
and can give the app permission to accept charges
for the appropriate number of rounds. This would
enable a UI not so different from that used in pay-
ment splitting apps today while the app handles the
details of the underlying protocol. At the same time,
this does not introduce new security concerns because
additional charges beyond the amount claimed will
register as new transactions, and users’ real balances
are not affected by this bookkeeping shortcut.
Payment splitting with collateral. Payment-
splitting groups sometimes encounter a problem where
one member incurs debt to others and repeatedly fails
to pay. One solution to this problem involves users
putting up money as collateral when joining a group
in order to insure their debts with a deposit should
they prove untrustworthy. We can make our scheme
compatible with this remedy as well. The core idea
is simple. At regular billing intervals, say monthly,
users provide the service provider with an additively
homomorphic Pedersen commitment [36] to their cur-
rent balance and a proof that the commitment is to a
value less than their deposit. If they cannot produce
such a proof, they must deposit more money until
they reach a point where they can.
The challenge lies in producing a commitment to a
value that provably corresponds to a user’s balance.
This can be accomplished by soliciting the assistance
of other users, each of which can submit to the server
a commitment to the masking value hiding the target
user’s balance. Since all users share a PRF key, they
can use the PRF to generate randomness for the
commitment, resulting in every member sending the
same commitment to the same value. Thus, so long
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Figure 2: A screenshot of our Android app. The
user has sent charges to Bob and Carol and also been
charged $1 by Carol, which can be rejected via the
“Reject Charge” button.
as one user is honest, the server will not be deceived
as to the masking value. Next, the server can, on its
own, create a commitment to the target user’s masked
balance, which it already knows. Once the server has
a commitment to the masked balance and the mask
value, it can subtract the mask and get a commitment
to the user’s actual balance, which the user can then
(in zero-knowledge) prove is less than the deposit.
7 Implementation and Evalua-
tion
We implemented our system as an Android app and
an accompanying server application using the Java
Spark framework [1]. Our app allows users to create
and join groups, send charges to each other, reject
unwanted charges from other users, and settle the
group balance if desired. We did not implement the
optimizations for supporting large transactions and
rollbacks. Figure 2 shows a screenshot of a group’s
page in the app.
We implemented our app as a simple front-end for
the functionality provided by our protocol, but there
is no technical limitation preventing more complex
user interfaces – such as those available in non-private
payment splitting apps in use today – being placed
in front of our protocol. For example, our app allows
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Figure 3: Number of rounds needed for transactions
of different amounts as we add our bandwidth-saving
optimizations. Over 90% of users in our survey re-
ported that their typical transactions fell to the left of
the vertical dotted line, and even a $1, 000 transaction
requires only 3 rounds, a 3, 300× improvement over
the na¨ıve scheme.
users to individually charge other users in a group. A
more complex app could provide an interface where
the user enters a charge that is assigned to the whole
group or some subset of the group, e.g. $80.56 split
among 4 people, and the app could split this into three
charges of $20.14 each for other diners to repay who-
ever paid the bill. Observe that such a splitting would
not run into issues with colliding charges because the
same user is initiating all the charges and can stagger
them over several rounds. This way charges from the
same real-world transaction always take place one at
a time.
We evaluated the performance of our implementa-
tion on a MacBook Pro with a 2.9 GHz Intel Core
i7 processor and 16GB RAM running macOS Sierra
Version 10.12.6 for the server and a Google Pixel
(1.6GHz quad-core processor, 4GB RAM) running
Android 8.1.0 for the app. Our performance tests
measure the server and client running time for one
round, using AES128 (default Android implementa-
tion) as our PRF. The reported times include all
computation outside of network communication and
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Figure 4: Server round computation time (in microsec-
onds) for one group. The same computation applies
for both the semihonest and malicious server settings.
92% of users in our survey reported that their largest
group size fell to the left of the vertical dotted line
(271µs).
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Figure 5: Client round computation time (in millisec-
onds) for the semihonest and malicious server settings.
92% of users in our survey reported that their largest
group size fell to the left of the vertical dotted line
(36.4/43.5ms).
are averages over 10 rounds each on the server side
and 5 each on the app. We measured performance
for groups of up to size 100 because no users reported
having a group of size greater than 100 in our survey.
Most groups were reported to be of less than 10 mem-
bers (69%) or less than 25 members (92%), a setting
where our protocol performs particularly well.
Rounds. Since we operate and measure our system
in terms of rounds, it is important to understand how
many rounds would be required to make realistic pay-
ments. Figure 3 shows the number of rounds required
to process transactions of various sizes and the impact
of our optimizations in reducing the number of rounds.
Our optimizations reduce the number of rounds re-
quired from linear to logarithmic in the transaction
value, resulting in savings of 500× and 3, 300× for $10
and $100 transactions respectively. A $100 transac-
tion requires 2 rounds to complete, and transactions
of over $1, 000 still require only 3 rounds. Recall that
we support transactions at the granularity of 1 cent,
so a $1, 000 transaction corresponds to the transfer
of 100, 000 cents. Returning to the example from the
beginning of this section, three $20.14 charges sent to
participants in a dinner that cost $80.56 would run in
two rounds each, resulting in six rounds to complete
the transaction.
Server Performance. Figure 4 shows the per-round
server side running time for a single group, which
ranges from about 200 microseconds for a group of
10 members to about 1.2 milliseconds for a group of
size 100. Since there are no server side changes to
the protocol between the semihonest and malicious
server settings, performance in the two regimes is iden-
tical. Computation for each group operates entirely
independently of other groups, so a server can scale
perfectly to a larger number of cores, enabling a server
only as powerful as a commodity laptop to handle
several thousands of groups per second. The extreme
efficiency and scalability of our scheme results from
the fact that the server does not execute any crypto-
graphic operations, only addition on 128-bit integers.
Server memory requirements per group are also small
because the server can add users’ inputs into running
totals for each round as they arrive, removing the need
to keep all messages for a given round in memory until
it completes.
Client Performance. Figure 5 shows the running
time for the Android app to compute its inputs and
process the outputs for each round. Running times
range from 26-286ms in the semihonest setting and
36-299ms in the malicious setting. The overhead of
malicious server security over semihonest security is
quite small in both relative and absolute terms – less
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than 5% for groups of 100 members and never more
than 20ms. Recall that the difference between semi-
honest and malicious security here applies only to the
server security protections, and both protocols provide
security against malicious users. The lightweight na-
ture of this computation, consisting primarily of PRF
evaluations and 128-bit additions, means it can conve-
niently run as a regular background process without
causing an undue burden on a user’s phone.
Bandwidth. The bandwidth of each round is 16N
bytes, where N is the group size, from each user,
and 52 bytes—three 16-byte values and one 4-byte
status code—sent back from the server to each user
regardless of group size (plus a negligible constant for
sending the data in JSON format). For group sizes
used in practice, this does not prove to be prohibitively
large. A user in a group of size 100 would only send
about 1.6KB of data, and users in the more commonly
reported group sizes of 10 or 25 would send 160B or
400B respectively.
Comparison to ZKLedger. ZKLedger [34] allows
parties with access to a distributed ledger to privately
record transactions and ensure the public integrity and
auditability of the ledger, primarily targeting large
financial institutions. Somewhat similarly, our scheme
aims to allow groups of private individuals to record
debts without compromising transaction privacy or
integrity. It should be noted that there are important
differences between the two settings. Our scheme
runs in a continuous series of rounds to hide who
initiates transactions whereas entries are only added to
ZKLedger when a transaction takes place. ZKLedger
offers additional auditing functionalities that are not
relevant to our use case. On the other hand, ZKLedger
does not offer an in-protocol mechanism for users to
contest charges, whereas our protocol does. Finally,
ZKLedger’s transactions must go on an ever-growing
ledger to enable external auditing whereas we have
no such requirement. Both systems, however, could
potentially be used for payment splitting applications.
To compare fairly with ZKLedger, we modify our
scheme so a round only takes place when a user initi-
ates a transaction. This leaks the identity of the user
initiating a charge, similar to ZKLedger. The change
does not affect other security properties.
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Figure 6: Computation and communication cost com-
parison to ZKLedger [34]. The vertical lines represent
the number of rounds needed for a single $1,000 trans-
action (in 3 rounds) and splitting a $80.56 dinner
among 4 people (in 6 rounds).
ZKLedger’s code is not public, so we can at best
compare to performance numbers reported by their
paper, which were taken using virtual machines, each
with 4 cores of Intel Xeon E5-2640 2.5 GHz processors,
24GB of RAM, and running 64-bit Linux 4.4.0 on
Ubuntu 16.04.3. Our system outperforms ZKLedger
in the payment splitting application despite running
most of its computation on a mobile phone processor.
We calculate our system’s computation time as the
sum of client and server running times for each round.
Figure 6 compares our performance to ZKLedger for
a ten member group (the largest for which ZKLedger
reports complete transaction times). Our scheme
processes a $1, 000 transaction with 7.3× less compu-
tation and with 6.8× lower bandwidth than ZKLedger,
and it splits a $80.56 dinner bill among 4 diners with
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3.7× less computation and with 3.4× lower bandwidth.
The tipping point where ZKLedger outperforms our
system is when a single transaction requires over 22
rounds to complete. Our faster performance comes
from using only AES in each round (ZKLedger uses
Pedersen commitments [36]) and the absence of large
zero-knowledge proofs from our design.
Note that if we were to use our unmodified system
(where the initiator of each charge is hidden from the
server and rounds occur at fixed time intervals) to
make each transaction above, the transaction latency
would be determined by the time taken per round,
a configurable parameter. As such, we would expect
such a transaction to clear more slowly if we also wish
to hide who initiates transactions.
8 Future Work
This section covers modifications to our architecture
and security model that could be explored in future
work.
Alternative system architectures. We built our
system to conform with the prevailing architecture of
payment splitting apps in use today, where clients con-
nect to a central server which provides the payment
splitting service. Although this architecture is partic-
ularly interesting due to its relevance to practice, a
number of other possibilities remain unexplored. For
example, the techniques used for query compression
in Riposte [22, 18] could be directly applied to a mul-
tiserver port of our system, reducing per-round band-
width per user to square root or even logarithmic [7]
in the group size. Settings where group members com-
municate among themselves may also lead to more
efficient schemes.
Alternative applications. In addition to consider-
ing other architectures for solving the payment split-
ting problem, we may also consider other problems
that may be solved by our current system architec-
ture. Although we have focused on payment splitting,
our solution can apply to many situations where a
group needs to privately keep records. For example,
our system could be used to allow a third-party IOT
device manufacturer to provide private analytics soft-
ware. Devices send “payment requests” when they
use energy or when a user interacts with them, with
a separate balance allocated for each aggregate being
measured by the software. The group of devices could
“settle” at the end of a month and reveal aggregated
analytics information to the manufacturer without
revealing the details of when a given device was used.
Most generally, our solution to payment splitting can
be seen as an approach to metadata-hiding communi-
cation that sends particularly structured messages.
Group hiding. A natural extension of our scheme
would be to hide group membership from the server.
We observe that hiding group membership fundamen-
tally changes the parameters of the problem. In our
setting, the server can treat each group separately,
allowing the number of groups to scale rapidly for
realistic group sizes. In the group hiding setting, how-
ever, since the server cannot determine which users
belong to the same group, server behavior must be
independent of group constitution. At this point, it
may be more effective to dispense with the structure
of groups and focus on the more general problem of
processing confidential transactions between arbitrary
users. Our work solves the real-world problem of pri-
vacy in payment splitting groups, but our techniques
do not appear to extend directly to handling general
confidential transactions.
9 Related Work
A number of generic cryptographic tools could be used
to achieve a functionality similar to ours. Most di-
rectly, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [20, 8, 21]
could be used for clients with a shared key to outsource
any computation to an untrusted server. Although
payment splitting is a special case of what can be
accomplished with FHE, FHE remains impractical
for most use cases today. Moreover, even with FHE,
we would require additional safeguards for integrity
against a malicious server.
Somewhat more practical are multiparty compu-
tation (MPC) techniques. Although the typical set-
ting for MPC [24] where multiple parties interact
with each other to compute a function does not ap-
ply to our setting, there are works that focus on
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MPC between users with the assistance of a single
server [19, 28, 29, 25]. Kamara et al. [28, 29] extend
an earlier garbled-circuits [41, 42] based approach of
Feige et al. [19] to such a setting, but since they work
with garbled boolean circuits, their approach would
incur a sizeable overhead in keeping track of user
balances compared to ours.
To our knowledge, our work is the first to directly
consider privacy in payment splitting. However, many
works deal with related problems in the space of pay-
ments and privacy. The notion of an anonymous digi-
tal currency in a centralized setting was first proposed
by Chaum [15, 16] and has been the subject of almost
continuous study since [17, 35, 9, 10, 14, 11, 12, 5, 40].
Since the advent of Bitcoin [33], decentralized cryp-
tocurrencies have come to the forefront of research
on privacy and digital payments. While Bitcoin it-
self only provides pseuodonymity to its users and has
been shown to admit tracing of user identities [3, 31],
a number of proposals for modifications or alterna-
tive cryptocurrencies provide stronger privacy guar-
antees [26, 30, 6]. ZKLedger [34] has a similar flavor
to our work in terms of private auditing but targets a
very different setting and at higher cost, see Section 7.
By focusing on the special case of payment splitting,
we build more efficient solutions than are possible in
the general case of anonymous payments.
Our solution for malicious security is similar to the
Homomorphic MACs of Agrawal and Boneh [2], which
belong to a class of works dealing with computation
on authenticated data first proposed by Johnson et
al [27]. Our construction can be viewed as a special
case of the MACs of Agrawal and Boneh, but the
security notions we require do not exactly align with
theirs. Their security game allows an adversary to
produce a valid tag on any linear combination of
previously produced messages, but we require that
an adversary can only send the exact results of the
server’s designated computation and no other function
of user-provided inputs.
10 Conclusion
We have presented a payment splitting app that hides
all transaction data from the service provider. We
showed how we achieve privacy and integrity in the
face of malicious users or a malicious server while only
relying on lightweight cryptography on user devices
and computing no cryptographic operations whatso-
ever on the server side. Our core protocol operates
in rounds, and we showed in our evaluation that it
can scale to large numbers of groups, requiring less
than 300 microseconds of computation per round for
the vast majority of groups. Likewise, the mobile
app requires less than 50 milliseconds of computation
per round on a user’s phone, providing users with
improved privacy in a payment splitting app at very
little computational cost.
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A Survey Text
This is a survey about your use of payment splitting
apps. This refers to apps which track credit/debit be-
tween peers, such as Splitwise, and does NOT include
apps that are designed mainly for one-off payments,
like Venmo. Since both kinds of apps can make charges
to your credit card, a good way to tell them apart is
that your balance can only go negative in a payment
splitting app.
Some examples of payment splitting apps: Splitwise,
Receipt Ninja, BillPin, SpotMe, Conmigo, and Settle
Up.
The results of this survey will be used as part of
an ongoing Visa Research project on payment split-
ting apps. Feel free to contact [redacted] with any
questions or comments.
1. What payment splitting app(s) do you use? If
you don’t use any, write “none” and answer the
questions below with regard to however you do
split payments.
2. How big is the largest group you have in such an
app?
(a) < 10
(b) 10− 25
(c) 25− 50
(d) 50− 100
(e) > 100
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3. How much money is used (per person) in one of
your typical transactions on this app?
(a) <$10
(b) $10− 30
(c) $30− 50
(d) $50− 100
(e) >$100
4. What is the typical number of transactions made
in one of your groups in a given day? Someone
paying for everyone’s lunch counts as 1 transac-
tion.
(a) <= 1
(b) 2− 3
(c) 4− 5
(d) 6− 9
(e) 10+
5. Is there a particular time of day where you use
the app most?
(a) Morning
(b) Midday
(c) Evening
(d) Weekend
(e) No Particular Time
6. When charging your friends for payments, to
what degree do you usually round the cost?
(a) Nearest cent (no rounding)
(b) Nearest 5 cents
(c) Nearest 10 cents
(d) Nearest 50 cents
(e) Nearest $1
(f) Other (please specify)
7. How often do you reject charges on this app?
(a) I never have
(b) Very rarely (less than Monthly)
(c) Monthly
(d) Weekly
(e) Daily
8. What are some issues you see as barriers to use
for existing payment splitting apps? Please select
all that apply.
(a) Peers not using them
(b) Slowness or crashing
(c) Lack of privacy of personal finance/behavior
data from app provider
(d) Poor usability: difficult to form groups, en-
ter charges, settle balances, etc.
(e) None: payment splitting apps are fine as-is
(f) Other (please specify)
9. If your app has a social media component, do
you set your transactions to “Public,” “Friends
Only,” or “Participants Only”? If it does not,
which would you choose if it did?
(a) Public
(b) Friends Only
(c) Participants Only
10. Suppose your payment splitting app is hacked
and all the information in it is stolen. Please
rank the following in order of how sensitive the
information is to you, with 1 being most sensitive.
(a) Businesses/locations where transactions
take place
(b) Dollar amounts of transactions
(c) Knowing who has rejected a charge and
which charges they rejected
(d) Knowing who is in the group
(e) Knowing who is involved in each transaction
and who pays
(f) The time when each transaction took place
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B Full Semihonest Construc-
tion
Here is a formal description of the version of our
scheme providing security only against a semihonest
server.
Our semihonest secure payment splitting scheme
Pp with security parameter λ and group size N uses
a PRF f with range {0, 1}λ. After setup, the scheme
proceeds in rounds, and messages are sent from each
client at a rate of one per round. Let m at any
time denote the round number at which the current
operation began, and let rm,i,j denote f(sk,m||i||j)
except rm,i,j = 0 for values of m smaller than the
round in which user Ui joined the group or after it
left.
Setup. The server stores a vector b of length N
constructed from copies of 0. Let a represent a vector
of length N constructed from N copies of 1. The
users store a value bi = 0 and the key sk.
Request. User i requests a unit of currency from
user j according to the following steps. In the next
round m, user Ui creates a vector vi where vi,j =
1 + rm,i,j and vi,k = 0 + rm,i,k, ∀k 6= j. All other
users Uk create vectors vk where vk,k = 1 + rm,k,k
and vk,k′ = 0 + rm,k,k′ , ∀k′ 6= k. Each user sends its
vector vi or vk to the server.
Upon receiving the messages from clients for the
round, the server takes the sum v = ΣNi=1vi and
also sums the values in v to get v′. The server then
sets b = b + v − a and computes the value c =
ΣNi=1(vi,i− 1) · 2i. The server sends the tuple (v′, c, bl)
to user Ul, l ∈ [N ].
Each user receives the values (v′∗, c∗, b∗l ) from the
server. Then there are a number of cases:
1. If v′∗ 6= N + ΣNi=0ΣNj=0rm,i,j , the user sends an
error message to the server who sets b = b−v+a
and outputs ⊥.
2. Otherwise, if c∗ = −2i−ΣNj=1(rm,j,j ·2j) for some
i ∈ [N ], each user Ul sets bl = b∗l . In this case,
user i outputs ⊥ if vi,i = 1 (if it did not make a
request).
3. If neither of the above cases apply, then more
than one request collided in the same round. Let
the vector c consist of the values i1, ..., iN such
that c∗ = ΣNj=1(−2ij − rm,j,j). In the next round
(m+ 1), each party Ui, i ∈ [N ] submits a vector
vi such that vi,i = b
∗
i − bi − rm,i,i + rm+1,i,i and
vi,k = 0 + rm+1,i,k∀k 6= i and the server behaves
as above. Then the various requests that collided
in this round are repeated, each in a subsequent
round, in order from smallest to largest value of
ij as the requester.
Trace. User j checks if anyone has charged her in
round m∗ as follows. First she computes v∗ = b∗j−bj−
ΣNl=1rm∗,l,j for the values of bj and b
∗
j before/after the
round m∗ in question to see if she has been charged
at all. If her balance has shrunk as a result of the
transaction, she looks at the value of c∗ in that round
and sets i∗ = log2(−c∗ − ΣNl=1(rm∗,l,l · 2l)).
Settle. The server outputs the vector b to the users.
The output vector for users is formed by setting bi =
bi − Σmm′=1ΣNj=1rm,i,j for each entry bi ∈ b.
C Deferred Proofs
Theorem 11. Assuming f is a secure PRF, the semi-
honest secure payment splitting scheme Pp has cor-
rectness, server privacy, debtor privacy, and user in-
tegrity.
Proof. Correctness follows from the construction, so
we do not discuss it further. For server privacy, it’s
important that the protocol proceeds in fixed rounds
and that the server does not know when a collision
has happened or is being resolved, so the server just
gets a vector of masked values from each user in each
round. The proof will rely on the fact that the PRF
outputs we use to mask values are indistinguishable
from random, meaning that an adversary can never
tell what masked values it has received.
Lemma 1. Assuming f is a secure PRF, the semi-
honest secure payment splitting scheme Pp has server
privacy.
Proof (server privacy). We proceed by a series of in-
distinguishable hybrids beginning with the experi-
ment PRIV[A, λ, 0] and ending with PRIV[A, λ, 1]. Let
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PRFADV be the advantage of adversary A (playing
the role of the server) in distinguishing an output of f
from a random string. The list of hybrids is as follows:
– H0: The real privacy experiment, PRIV[A, λ, 0]
– H1: Same as the previous hybrid, but the outputs
of f(sk, ·) are replaced by outputs of a random
function. This is indistinguishable from the pre-
vious hybrid by the PRF security of f .
– H2: Same as the previous hybrid, but the trans-
action executed by C is t1 instead of t0.
– H3: Same as the previous hybrid, but the random
function outputs used to mask each value sent
to the server are replaced by evaluations f(sk, ·)
as described in the construction of the scheme
Pp. This is indistinguishable from the previous
hybrid by the PRF security of f and is exactly
the security experiment PRIV[A, λ, 1].
We use a standard argument to show that adver-
sary A distinguishes between experiments H0 and H1
with advantage at most PRFADV. The argument for
experiments H2 and H3 is the same, so we omit it.
We use the adversary A that distinguishes between
the outputs of H0 and H1 to construct an adversary B
that wins the PRF security game for f with the same
advantage. B acts as the challenger in the privacy
game with A while simultaneously playing as the
adversary in the PRF security game. It reproduces
the game for H0 exactly except that any queries to
f(sk, ·) are replaced by queries to the PRF security
game challenger. Observe that if the PRF challenger
is using a PRF on a randomly sampled key, then B
provides a perfect simulation of the game H0. On the
other hand, if the PRF challenger is using a random
function, B provides a perfect simulation of the game
H1. Thus the output of A wins the PRF security
game with the same probability that it distinguishes
between H0 and H1.
Observe that since values sent to the server in H1
and H2 are masked with independently random strings,
the distributions of messages sent to the server in these
two worlds is identical. As such, the advantage of
adversary A in distinguishing between PRIV[A, λ, 0]
and PRIV[A, λ, 1] is at most 2·PRFADV = 2·negl(λ) =
negl(λ), completing the proof.
Next, we prove that our scheme satisfies the defini-
tion of debtor privacy. Note that because the debtor
privacy adversary can corrupt users in the group, it
has access to the group key. As such, debtor privacy
will not use the security of the PRF f , relying instead
only on the structure of our protocol.
Lemma 2. The semihonest secure payment splitting
scheme Pp has debtor privacy.
Proof (debtor privacy). We will directly prove debtor
by privacy by showing that the view of the
adversary in the games DEBTPRIV[A, λ, 0] and
DEBTPRIV[A, λ, 1] are distributed identically. The
view of each user controlled by the adversary in each
round of the debtor privacy game consists of an up-
dated masked balance (which will be different for each
user), a check value v′ corresponding the sum of all
entries in every user’s input vector for that round,
and the tracing value c used to find out who sent a
charge in that round. In a settle operation, each user
gets an identical vector b. We will show that all of
these values are independent of b.
Note that the balances of corrupted users are never
affected differently in transactions t0 and t1 (or else
C outputs 0), so the balances of the corrupted users
will always be the same at all points regardless of b.
Thus the balances of corrupted users after a transac-
tion where t0 and t1 differ will be the same as they
were before with some new masking values added in.
These masking values do not depend on b (they only
depend on the round number and the PRF key), so
malicious users’ balances are distributed identically
in DEBTPRIV[A, λ, 0] and DEBTPRIV[A, λ, 1].
Next, since honest users always submit vectors
whose entries sum to 1 in every round, the contri-
bution of every honest user to v′ will be independent
of b.
The tracing value c depends only on the entry each
user’s vector places in the user’s own index. An honest
user who is making a charge will put a masked 0 in this
position, but all other honest users will put a masked
1 because they will not be making any charges. Thus
the input of a user being charged and a user not being
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charged (with the exception of the one making the
charge) will always be the same value. This means
that the tracing value c will be distributed the same
regardless of the value of b.
The security definition requires that all balances be
identical across both transcripts when a settlement
occurs (or else C outputs 0), so the vectors b sent
by the server during settlement will naturally be the
same regardless of b.
Since we have shown that every element of
the adversary’s view is distributed identically in
DEBTPRIV[A, λ, 0] and DEBTPRIV[A, λ, 1], we can
conclude that no PPT adversary can distinguish be-
tween the two experiments with any advantage.
Lemma 3. The semihonest secure payment splitting
scheme Pp has user integrity.
Proof (user integrity). To prove user integrity, we
need to prove three separate claims. First, we must
show that any input that would cause the sum of
user balances (if the group were to settle) to sum
to a nonzero value must be detected, even if all but
one member of the group is controlled by a malicious
adversary. Second, we must show that a user’s locally
held balance always matches the balance reported
when settling. Third, we must show that an honest
user who did not initiate a transaction in a given
round can always detect if he has been framed as
having done so.
The first component of user integrity is satisfied by
the server polling all users to ensure that the sum of
their inputs equals the (masked) group size N . Since
all users are polled, as long as one honest user remains
to catch an error, the server will learn that a user
has violated integrity in that round. This suffices to
prove the desired property because all balances are
set to zero at the time of a group’s creation, so the
only opportunity for the balances to sum to a nonzero
value when a group settles is if there is a round where
the sum of all the users’ inputs is not equal to the
group size N (the sum is N instead of 0 because the
server subtracts off 1 from each index before adding
the sum of user inputs into the balances). The sum
of all users’ inputs will equal N in an honest round
by the correctness of the protocol.
The fact that a user’s balance always matches the
output of settling follows directly from the construc-
tion because the server sends each user its current
entry in the balance vector in each round.
Proving that an honest user can detect whether
he has been framed follows from the correctness of
the construction. By this we mean that the security
property does not rely on any particular property of
the tracing mechanism except that users will agree
on who appears to be making a charge according
to the rules of the protocol. Our protocol, when
executed honestly, always results in the tracing value c
containing a (masked) power of two −2i corresponding
to a charge coming from user i. As such, whenever c
contains −2i for a user i who did not make a charge
in the corresponding round, user i can tell that he is
being framed.
Theorem 12. Assuming f is a secure PRF, the fully
malicious secure payment splitting scheme Pm has cor-
rectness, server privacy, debtor privacy, user integrity,
and server integrity (against a malicious server).
Proofs of correctness, server privacy, debtor privacy,
and user integrity for the malicious secure scheme Pm
closely resemble those of the semihonest scheme Pp.
The server privacy proof is identical because replacing
the various rm,i,j values in the construction with ran-
dom values suffices to render the games PRIV[A, λ, 0]
and PRIV[A, λ, 1] indistinguishable. Proofs of debtor
privacy and user integrity only replace the integrity
check and balance values seen by the users with the
more complex values involving s that appear in the
malicious secure scheme.
Server integrity holds because it is hard for the
server to generate a message to a client that will be
accepted as legitimate. This is the case because there
are only a limited number of values a client will accept
in a given round, and the server can do no better
than guessing at correct ones. For example, a client
knows that its balance will either be incremented or
decremented, and that the charger will be one of N
possible parties. Since the pseudorandom value s
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and the per-message randomness mask messages from
the server, the server has a negligible probability of
finding a message that can be correctly unmasked to
an acceptable multiple of s.
Lemma 4. Assuming f is a secure PRF, the fully
malicious secure payment splitting scheme Pm has
server integrity (against a malicious server).
Proof (server integrity). Let PRFADV be the advan-
tage of adversary A in distinguishing an output of f
from a random string. First, using a hybrid analogous
to the step between hybrids H0 and H1 in the server
privacy proof above, we can replace all evaluations of
f with evaluations of a random function.
In each round, the server sends each client an up-
dated balance, an integrity check value, and a value c
which identifies anyone making a charge in that round.
Whatever value the server produces must be of the
form v∗ = s · x+ y where s and y are known to the
users but not the server, with y changing for every
message and s fixed. In the case of the integrity value,
x must be N , in the case of the balance, x must be the
previous balance +/− 1 (unless the requester value
indicates a collision, where it doesn’t matter what it
is), and for the requester value, x must be a power of
2 or a sum of at most N powers of 2. In the case a
second round is used for users to send their masked
inputs without multiplying by s, each value x sent by
the server must correspond to the same value sent in
the previous round. This means that the malicious
server has at most z = O(N) acceptable values that
it can set x to be for any message.
Since each value sent from the server to the users
in each round is a distinct combination of a subset of
users’ inputs, s and y are independently random. As
a result, the probability that v∗− y = s ·x for a value
of x expected/acceptable to a client is 1
2λ
for each
acceptable value. Since there are O(N) acceptable
values, there will be an O( N
2λ
) probability that a server
successfully forges a given message. Taking a union
bound over all server messages in the course of the
protocol (m rounds of O(N) messages each), we get
that A can break server integrity with probability at
most O(mN
2
2λ
).
We have now covered server integrity for requests
and tracing (both are included in the round by round
structure of our protocol), but we must cover settling
separately. Fortunately, settling operates according to
more or less the same principles as the round protocol.
The server sends each user a value corresponding to
every other user’s balance pi masked with an indepen-
dently random value yi followed by a second value v
∗
which must correspond to s · pi + y′i for another in-
dependently random y′i. As above, the probability of
successfully fooling a user into accepting an incorrect
value p∗i is
1
2λ
, and the union bound over all messages
sent to all users for each of n settlements is less than
nN2
2λ
.
Finally, the probability that a message from a ma-
licious server S∗ deviates from what an honest server
S would send without being caught is at most the
sum of the distinguishing advantage between H0 and
H1, and the probabilities of failure for the rounds and
for settlement. That is PRFADV +O(mN
2
2λ
) + nN
2
2λ
<
negl(λ).
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